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INTRODUCTION

In December 2016, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security disclosed that malicious software (malware) found on a computer system
owned by a Vermont utility called the Burlington Electric Company
was the same variant as that used to breach the Democratic National
Committee (DNC).1 This admittedly overhyped episode is the latest in
a string of cybersecurity incidents that involve U.S. critical infrastructure (CI) and that have been linked to Russia. Already, a number of
nations have seen their systems compromised by such attempts, such
as Ukraine, which experienced several of its substations crashing in
December 2015 in “the first-ever confirmed cyberattack against grid
infrastructure.”2 Unfortunately, the same type of attack played out
again in Ukraine on December 23, 2016.3 This Article examines the
most recent of such hacks and investigates the current state of U.S.
efforts to advance cybersecurity, including to what extent the recently
released draft Version 1.1 of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework will contribute to safeguarding vulnerable U.S. CI and what further steps—such as an effective deterrence strategy—are needed going forward.
This Article is structured as follows: Part II briefly summarizes the
history of alleged Russian hacking on U.S. critical infrastructure and
government networks from the 1990s to 2016.4 Part III builds from
1. See Evan Perez, Vermont Utility Finds Alleged Russian Malware on Computer,
CNN (Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/30/us/grizzly-steppe-malwareburlington-electric [https://perma.unl.edu/TWE3-BBW2].
2. Jeff St. John, The Real Cybersecurity Issues Behind the Overhyped “Russia Hacks
the Grid” Story, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia
.com/articles/read/the-real-cybersecurity-issues-behind-the-overhyped-russiahacks-the-grid-st [https://perma.unl.edu/4RJK-NDC5].
3. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, Ukraine Claims Hackers Caused Christmas Power
Outage, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/
2016/01/04/ukraine-power-out-cyber-attack/#77b6ed5d5e6f [https://perma.unl
.edu/AG5E-T6QE].
4. See What Is Critical Infrastructure?, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs
.gov/what-critical-infrastructure [https://perma.unl.edu/H5EG-TWZ4]; What Is
ICS-CERT’s Mission?, INDUS. CONTROL SYS. CYBER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM,
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Frequently-Asked-Questions [https://perma.unl.edu/
QW8H-VJET] (giving sixteen critical-infrastructure sectors the U.S. Cyber Emergency Response Team has identified, consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, including: chemical, commercial facilities, communications,
critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, health care
and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors and materials, transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems).
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the foundation laid in Part II with a comparative case study exploring
the 2015 and 2016 cyber attacks on the Ukraine power grid. Part IV
explores policy prescriptions to enhance U.S. critical-infrastructure
cybersecurity with a focus on unpacking draft Version 1.1 of the 2017
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, exploring international cybersecurity norm building in the CI context and laying out a deterrence
strategy for mitigating the Russian cyber threat to U.S. CI and government systems.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF RUSSIAN HACKING OF U.S.
GOVERNMENT NETWORKS AND CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
A comprehensive rendering of Russia’s alleged and now decadeslong information-warfare campaign against the U.S. government and
U.S.-based critical infrastructure is beyond the scope of this Article.
Rather, this Part helps inform the following discussion on contemporary challenges and policy prescriptions by briefly summarizing several of the early Russian campaigns and comparing them to what has
transpired since. In particular, we focus on two episodes—the late
1990s “Moonlight Maze” campaign and the 2016 DNC hack—to gain a
better understanding of how Russian cybersecurity strategy has
evolved in the nearly twenty-year span bookending these events.
The Moonlight Maze attacks of the late 1990s became among the
most extensive cyber attacks aimed at the U.S. government to that
point, involving attackers gaining access to thousands of sensitive
files.5 According to U.S. officials, state-sponsored Russian hackers
penetrated U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) computers for more
than one year, stealing data from U.S. agencies such as the Department of Energy and NASA, as well as from military contractors and
universities.6 Damage from the attacks was limited to unclassified
networks but prompted a great deal of concern in the U.S. government. Some officials, including then-Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Richard Clarke, likened it to pre-war reconnaissance.7
While Moonlight Maze in many respects introduced the risk of
Russian and other state-sponsored hacking into the consciousness of
U.S. officials, later events would show how widespread the threat was
and continues to be. In 2015, it was reported that Russian hackers had
gained access to the unclassified White House email network that was
used for scheduling, personnel matters, correspondence with overseas
5. See Major Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use
Under International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 141 (2009).
6. See id.
7. Id.; see BENJAMIN BUCHANAN, THE CYBERSECURITY DILEMMA (2017); THOMAS RID,
RISE OF THE MACHINES: A CYBERNETIC HISTORY 314 (2016).
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diplomats, and more.8 The same group of hackers was reportedly able
to access key networks in the Pentagon, such as the email systems
used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; in the State Department, where
remediation proved to be an ongoing challenge;9 and in a wide variety
of other targets.
The election year of 2016 brought even greater attention to potential Russian cyber operations. According to CrowdStrike, not one but
two Russian intelligence agencies, the nominally domestic FSB and
the military-intelligence-focused GRU, gained access to the networks
of the Democratic National Committee and to the email accounts of
staffers on the Hillary Clinton campaign.10 While much cyber espionage up to this point involved using the stolen secrets out of view,
those involved in this hack took a different tack. They splayed stolen
data out on social media, on the anti-secrecy site WikiLeaks, and in
newspapers.11 While the individual revelations themselves were not
enormously consequential—the most significant email forced the
ouster of Democratic National Committee Chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz because of the party’s perceived favoritism towards
Hillary Clinton over primary rival Bernie Sanders—they consumed an
enormous amount of media attention.12 Historians will debate the degree to which the hacking and information operation persuaded voters
to choose Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton; an assessment by the
U.S. intelligence community later concluded that this was the Russians’ aim.13
The ongoing drip of hacked files and emails throughout the summer and fall of 2016 raised the concern about Russian cyber capabilities to a previously unprecedented level. Reportedly, President Obama
8. Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, Russian Hackers Read Obama’s Unclassified Emails, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2015, at A1, https://www.ny
times.com/2015/04/26/us/russian-hackers-read-obamas-unclassified-emails-offi
cials-say.html?_r=0.
9. See Justin Fishel & Lee Ferran, State Dept. Shuts Down Email After Cyber Attack, ABC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/US/state-dept-shutsemail-cyber-attack/story?id=29624866 [https://perma.unl.edu/QZ8R-3FUQ].
10. Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National
Committee, CROWDSTRIKE (June 15, 2016), https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/
bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee [https://perma.unl.edu/
4PCY-Y8VV].
11. Thomas Rid, All Signs Point to Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack, VICE (July
24, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/all-signs-point-to-russia-be
ing-behind-the-dnc-hack [https://perma.unl.edu/6L2P-MAPM].
12. See, e.g., id.
13. Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Secret CIA Assessment Says Russia Was Trying to Help Trump Win White House, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-orders-reviewof-russian-hacking-during-presidential-campaign/2016/12/09/31d6b300-be2a-11e
6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html?utm_term=.4992441a5ab3 [https://perma.unl
.edu/3SS4-B4NG].
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attempted to achieve bipartisan consensus in condemning the hacks
but was rebuffed by Senator Mitch McConnell.14 In lieu of that feat,
and wary of Russian operations that might change votes rather than
target voters, it is reported that the United States used a Cold Warlike communications mechanism to warn Russia against targeting
election infrastructure itself. Specifically, as Election Day came and
went without Russian manipulation of vote-counting mechanisms,
this warning can be perhaps be viewed as an instance of successful
deterrence.15 Nonetheless, towards the end of the Obama presidency,
he saw fit to punish the Russians for their reported interference in the
electoral process, levying sanctions, expelling diplomats, and closing
two Russian compounds in the United States.16 It was a watershed
moment, as the intersection of computer hacking and international intrigue emerged more fully than ever before into public view. This sets
the stage for other, more explicitly damaging hacks of Ukraine’s grid,
showing a broader range of possible Russian cyber operations.
III. UNPACKING THE UKRAINE GRID HACKS
AND THEIR AFTERMATH
While cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are not unprecedented, the recent penetrations in December 2015 and December 2016
against the electrical grid in Ukraine have gained widespread notoriety given that they show what is possible for unprepared sectors.17 As
a result, thoroughly understanding the Ukrainian cyber attacks provides governments a glimpse into the strategies adversarial hackers
use and helps to underscore what can be done about it.
To set the stage, the recent cyber attacks on Ukraine’s electrical
grid were not the first to plague the country. Since 2014, there has
been a string of cyber attacks that have targeted—with varying degrees of success—various industries within Ukraine.18 In May 2014,
14. Id.
15. David E. Sanger, White House Confirms Pre-Election Warning to Russia over
Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2016, at A20, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
17/us/politics/white-house-confirms-pre-election-warning-to-russia-over-hacking
.html?_r=0.
16. David E. Sanger, Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2016, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/rus
sia-election-hacking-sanctions.html.
17. See, e.g., Darlene Storm, Cyberwarfare: Digital Weapons Causing Physical Damage, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.computerworld.com/article/
2861531/cyberwarfare-digital-weapons-causing-physical-damage.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/H67W-TBUD].
18. JAKE STYCZYNSKI, NATE BEACH-WESTMORELAND & SCOTT STABLES, WHEN THE
LIGHTS WENT OUT: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE 2015 ATTACKS ON UKRAINIAN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 7 (2016), http://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/
boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/F9MF-SXGV].
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threat actors targeted Ukrainian electricity distributor Prykarpattyaoblenergo and all six of Ukraine’s state railway transportation-system operators as part of a phishing campaign.19 In August 2014, a
similar campaign attacked five Ukrainian regional government
sources and state archives.20 This occurred again in March 2015, with
the target this time being Ukrainian television broadcasters.21 In October 2015, on Ukraine’s election day, BlackEnergy and KillDisk
malware were used to hack into numerous government workstations.22 A similar attack was also used to target Ukrainian mining
firms.23 These attacks shared similar characteristics in both their
methodology of operation and use of certain malware. As such, the
cyber attacks in December 2015 may be considered the climax of a
chain of exploits that sought to obtain valuable information from, and
eventually cripple, specific industry sectors within Ukraine.
In December 2015, adversarial hackers successfully infiltrated
workstations within three Ukrainian energy-distribution companies—
Prykarpattyoblenergo, Kyivoblenergo, and Chernivtsioblenergo—and
caused physical damage to the electrical grid.24 This left over two hundred thousand people in western Ukraine without power for several
hours.25 The threat actors were able to change security measures and
disable communication channels, prolonging the blackout and
preventing recovery efforts by the respective company employees.26
Several sources, including Booz Allen, attributed the cyber attacks to
Russian hackers who may have been acting under the direction of the
Kremlin.27
Almost one year after the December 2015 cyber attacks, another
campaign was conducted against the Ukrainian electrical grid. This
time, a power substation was targeted, leaving 100,000 to 200,000 residents of Kiev without power.28 Eventually, approximately one-fifth
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
See James Temperton, Hackers Were Behind Ukraine Power Outage, WIRED (Feb.
26, 2016), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ukrainian-power-station-cyber-attack
[https://perma.unl.edu/MF2F-9YTQ].
26. See Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power
Grid, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-un
precedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid [https://perma.unl.edu/U9J2-MTKZ].
27. STYCZYNSKI ET AL., supra note 18, at 8.
28. Patrick Tucker, Ukrainian Power Company “99% Certain” Blackout Result of
Cyber Attack, DEF. ONE (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/
2016/12/ukrainian-power-company-99-certain-blackout-result-cyber-attack/1340
99/ [https://perma.unl.edu/D4LT-G3B7].
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of Kiev’s electrical power was cut as a result of the attack.29 Further
investigation has linked this cyber attack with the December 2015
attack.30
While the direct effects of these incidents unnerved the Ukrainian
government and contributed to increased tensions between Ukraine
and Russia, these cyber attacks had far-reaching effects beyond Eastern Europe. The threat-actor group, dubbed SandWorm, believed to
have conducted the aforementioned cyber attacks is also thought to
have conducted attacks against NATO and Western European governmental targets,31 which raises the question as to the sufficiency of
other nations’ ability to prevent attacks against their own electrical
grids. Numerous nations, including the United States, took notice of
the swiftness and sophistication of these attacks and responded by
reevaluating their own respective security systems. In turn, numerous
issues were discovered concerning the safety of CI during future attacks, in particular focusing on the vulnerability of smart-grid tech,
international norm building, and the increasing sophistication of
attackers.32
First, many electrical grids are using outdated industrial control
systems that are unable to prevent adversarial hackers from infiltrating vulnerable networks; in particular, “[t]he underlying protocols and
components take no account of modern internet threats and so are inherently insecure.”33 In response, some nations have attempted to update their grids; ironically, though, this has multiplied vulnerabilities
through the rise of smart-grid systems.34 According to a report by the
Congressional Research Service:
[N]ew intelligent technologies utilizing two-way communications and other
digital advantages are being optimized by Internet connectivity. Moderniza29. Ukraine Power Cut “Was Cyber-Attack,” BBC (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.bbc
.com/news/technology-38573074 [https://perma.unl.edu/Y2VA-AKSH].
30. Id.
31. Ellen Nakashima, Russian Hackers Suspected in Attack that Blacked Out Parts of
Ukraine, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na
tional-security/russian-hackers-suspected-in-attack-that-blacked-out-parts-of-uk
raine/2016/01/05/4056a4dc-b3de-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html?utm_term
=.3602b71d8e8c [https://perma.unl.edu/Q7BB-FJGC].
32. Cf. BEN BUCHANAN, THE LEGEND OF SOPHISTICATION IN CYBER OPERATIONS 1
(2017), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Legend
%20Sophistication%20-%20web.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/FJS6-VA4H] (exploring what the term “sophistication” means in the context of cyber operations).
33. Nilufer Tuptuk & Stephen Hailes, The Cyberattack on Ukraine’s Power Grid Is a
Warning of What’s to Come, PHYS.ORG (Jan. 13, 2016), https://phys.org/news/
2016-01-cyberattack-ukraine-power-grid.html [https://perma.unl.edu/4CFZGLWG].
34. Loren Thompson, Five Reasons the U.S. Power Grid Is Overdue for a Cyber Catastrophe, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2015/
08/19/five-reasons-the-u-s-power-grid-is-overdue-for-a-cyber-catastrophe/2/#2e67
0805513c [https://perma.unl.edu/2FBQ-7ZR9].
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tion of many IC [industrial control] systems . . . has resulted in connections to
the Internet. While these advances will improve the efficiency and performance of the grid, they also will increase its vulnerability to potential
cyberattacks.35

Thus, modernized “smart” grids may in fact increase, not limit, the
number of avenues that hackers can exploit.
Second, the use of cyber attacks to damage critical infrastructure
has increased international tensions and undermined cybersecurity
norm-building efforts (a topic discussed further in Part IV). Specifically, the cyber attacks against Ukraine in December 2015 and 2016
have been linked to Russia, though the degree of state sponsorship
remains an area of active debate.36 This has made the international
community weary of Russia and other nations using cyber attacks to
cause similar damage, especially considering that, by some estimates,
the electrical control systems that were hacked were in fact more secure than some U.S. counterparts.37
Finally, the sophistication of threat actors has increased to an
alarming level, though not across the board.38 While governments and
security firms try to stay one step ahead, the ability of adversarial
hackers and their tools means that they are able to penetrate ever
more sophisticated defenses39 to achieve a large range of motivations.40 Whether it be retribution, monetary gain, or a social or political cause, a successful hack of a power grid holds the promise for
causing far-reaching consequences. In turn, the increased number of
potential suspects makes it more difficult to identify, locate, and prevent possible cyber attacks, which can lead to an increase in spending
35. RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43989, CYBERSECURITY ISSUES
FOR THE BULK POWER SYSTEM (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43989.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/J2GR-9UMP]; see also AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2013
REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE (2013), http://2013.infrastructurere
portcard.org/a/#p/energy/overview [https://perma.unl.edu/VA4C-TN5A] (“America
relies on an aging electrical grid and pipeline distribution systems, some of which
originated in the 1880s. Investment in power transmission has increased since
2005, but ongoing permitting issues, weather events, and limited maintenance
have contributed to an increasing number of failures and power interruptions.”).
36. See Pavel Polityuk, Ukraine Investigates Suspected Cyber Attack on Kiev Power
Grid, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisiscyber-attacks-idUSKBN1491ZF [https://perma.unl.edu/2RNZ-9L7C].
37. See Daniel Wagner & Dante Disparte, The Growing Severity of Cyber-Attacks and
How to Protect Against Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.huf
fingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/the-growing-severity-of-c_b_13601810.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/M3FM-8VDH].
38. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 32.
39. See generally Trevor McDougal, Note, Establishing Russia’s Responsibility for
Cyber-Crime Based on Its Hacker Culture, 11 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 55
(2015).
40. See Tuptuk & Hailes, supra note 33.
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by these industries to implement sufficient cyber defenses—with the
cost ultimately being born by consumers.41
The cyber attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure have raised
awareness with regards to the vulnerabilities of numerous industries
and have led some governments to take action to mitigate the risk of
future attacks.42 In the United States, this has fed into the narrative
surrounding cybersecurity regulation or other approaches to risk mitigation, in particular as it relates to the role of the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework and the overall need for effective cyber deterrence to safeguard vulnerable U.S. CI. Part IV analyzes these steps in an effort to
understand whether they are, in fact, sufficient to ensure that the
cyber attacks against Ukraine’s power grid are not repeated
domestically.
IV. ANALYZING POLICY OPTIONS TO HELP PROMOTE THE
RESILIENCE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS AND
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
There is no perfect solution to the issue of safeguarding vulnerable
government systems and diverse CI systems. As a result, a range of
policy tools and strategies are needed to address the threat of advanced nation-state actors. The U.S. government has taken some
steps forward in this vein with the development and dissemination of
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, including the recent 2017 Version 1.1 Draft, along with intensive cybersecurity norm-building efforts. This Part reviews these developments along with the potential
for an effective deterrence strategy to help mitigate the cyber threat to
U.S. systems—from Russia or otherwise—going forward.
A. Contextualizing and Introducing Draft Version 1.1 of the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework
Efforts to identify and protect U.S. CI have been ongoing for decades. In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PPD-63) designated authorities to protect U.S. CI from intentional physical and
cyber attacks; in October 2001, two Executive Orders (EOs) were
signed, establishing new authorities and coordination mechanisms to
protect U.S. CI and recover from incidents; and in 2003, the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) updated agencies’ roles
and responsibilities in protecting CI.43 Keeping in place much of the
41. CAMPBELL, supra note 35, at 30.
42. See Wagner & Disparte, supra note 37 (“Despite the fact that cyber-attacks occur
with greater frequency and intensity around the world, many either go unreported or are under-reported, leaving the public with a false sense of security
about the threat they pose and the lives and property they impact.”).
43. JOHN D. MOTEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30153, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES:
BACKGROUND, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 11 (2015) (“The Bush Administration
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policy and organization established by the Bush Administration, the
Obama Administration declared U.S. CI to be a “strategic national asset” back in 2009, but little progress was made following the pronouncement, and 2012 legislative proposals to strengthen
cybersecurity were filibustered.44 In response, in 2013, President
Obama issued EO 13,636 that, among other things, expanded public–private information sharing and tasked NIST to work with the private sector and other stakeholders to develop a cybersecurity
framework for CI. In addition, from 2013 to 2016, the Obama Administration issued PPD-21 and a draft update to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, conducted a “Cyber Sprint” to assess agency
defenses, and developed the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) and Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP) to
drive improvements to federal cybersecurity and resilience.
As it was tasked in EO 13,636, NIST partnered with its stakeholder community to develop the Framework for Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity (the Cybersecurity Framework or Framework), Version 1 of which it released in 2014.45 Both the Framework
itself and the process through which it was developed represented an
important step forward for the U.S. government and CI; the focus was
on reaching consensus through an inclusive process on best practices
that the private sector could adopt to better secure systems.46 In particular, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework captures industry best
practices to provide—its proponents argue—a flexible approach to
boosting cybersecurity governance, assisting owners and operators of
CI in managing cyber risk and engaging executives in enterprise riskmanagement conversations that scope in cybersecurity. In addition,
policy and approach regarding critical infrastructure protection can be described
as an evolutionary expansion of the policies and approaches laid out in PPD-63.
The fundamental policy statements were essentially the same . . . . Also, the
stated goal of the government’s efforts is to ensure that any disruption of the
services provided by these infrastructures be infrequent, of minimal duration,
and manageable. . . . Finally, the primary effort was directed at working collaboratively and voluntarily with the private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure . . . .”).
44. Id. at 12–13. One notable organizational change directed by President Obama
was the appointment of a White House official to coordinate cybersecurity policies
and activities. Id.; A Better Defined and Implemented National Strategy Is
Needed to Address Persistent Challenges, GAO (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.gao
.gov/products/GAO-13-462T [https://perma.unl.edu/YL7V-LSKY] (“Further, without an integrated strategy that includes key characteristics, the federal government will be hindered in making further progress in addressing cybersecurity
challenges.”).
45. NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK
(2013), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminary-cybersecurity-framework.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/K3BX-2LSG].
46. See id. at 1.
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the Framework is particularly relevant for CI because it acts as a
baseline that is relevant across sectors, many of which are independent and thus reap security benefits from compatible guidance or requirements, recognizing that it may also be necessary to have sectorspecific guidance or requirements to complement a cross-sector
baseline.
This Framework is also important since—even though its critics
argue that it helps to solidify a reactive stance to the nation’s cybersecurity challenges47—it is arguably spurring the development of a
standard of cybersecurity care in the United States, which is an important step given how fragmented this process has been to date.48
Although the Framework has only been available since 2014,49 already some private-sector clients are receiving the advice that if their
“cybersecurity practices were ever questioned during litigation or a
regulatory investigation, the ‘standard’ for ‘due diligence’ was now the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework.”50 Eventually, the Framework could
help shape a standard of care for domestic CI organizations while also
driving collaboration and compatibility in global cybersecurity best
practices, especially given active NIST collaborations with a number
of nations including the U.K., Japan, and Korea.51
Consistent with the roadmap that NIST issued along with the
Framework Version 1 (v1) in 2014 as well as the comments and feedback that NIST has collected through Requests for Information and
public workshops since the release of v1, in January 2017, NIST is47. Taylor Armerding, NIST’s Finalized Cybersecurity Framework Receives Mixed
Reviews, CSO ONLINE (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134338/
security-leadership/nist-s-finalized-cybersecurity-framework-receives-mixed-reviews.html [https://perma.unl.edu/AF3P-U2W2]. For more on the benefits of a
more proactive approach to cybersecurity, see Amanda N. Craig, Scott J. Shackelford & Janine S. Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and
Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721 (2015).
48. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of
Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on
Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 305 (2015).
49. See NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH, FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 26 (2015), http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/
upload/cybersecurity_framework_bsi_2015-04-08.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
W7C6-SV3V] (“To allow for adoption, Framework version 2.0 is not planned for
the near term.”).
50. John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary,
PIVOTPOINT SECURITY (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/blog/
nist-cybersecurity-framework [https://perma.unl.edu/Q3Y9-RGVN]; see Andrea
Arias, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/08/
nist-cybersecurity-framework-ftc [https://perma.unl.edu/8Q7S-EU4R].
51. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russel & Jeffrey Haut,
Bottoms Up: A Comparison of “Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 217, 222 (2016).
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sued a draft update to the Framework: v1.1. Rather than aiming for
fundamental changes to the Framework, the draft update is intended
to clarify and enhance v1. To that end, the basic structure of the
Framework is unchanged; the components of the Core, Tiers, and
Profiles remain intact.52 Indeed, within the Framework’s Core, no
Functions were added; just one Category was added (“Supply Chain
Risk Management”—along with five accompanying Subcategories);
and only three additional Subcategories were included (bringing the
total to 106). Meanwhile, in other Categories and Subcategories, language was updated and clarified (e.g., within the “Risk Assessment”
and “Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control” Categories), and NIST is continuing to assess potential updates to Information References. Keeping the structure of the Core, as well as much
of its content, consistent was a critically important step since the
structure and content of the Core have proved fundamental to the
Framework’s success.
In addition to minor updates to the Core and other sections, within
draft v1.1 of the Framework, NIST has also incorporated some significant new content, including a section on metrics and measures, and an
expanded explanation on how to use the Framework for cyber supplychain risk management (C-SCRM). Among the most dramatic changes
is the inclusion of Section 4.0—“Measuring and Demonstrating Cybersecurity”—which proposes that the Framework can be used as the basis for “comprehensive measurement”—both “metrics,” which
facilitate decision-making, and the “measures,” or quantifiable data,
that inform those metrics. In addition, within the Implementation
Tiers and Sections 3.3 and 3.4, there is substantial new C-SCRM content intended to inform both organizations’ assessment of their CSCRM practices as well as their conversations with information and
communication technology (ICT) suppliers and buyers.
While some of the Framework’s draft v1.1 updates are indeed helpful, others may risk undermining the unique value of the Framework
as a cross-sector baseline and be better incorporated as evolving documents that supplement the Framework. Because the cyber-threat
landscape is rapidly evolving and security technologies are continually
advancing, so too must government entities, CI, and other enterprises
continually adapt and improve their defenses. Likewise, policy and
guidance documents must also be updated to capture recent best prac52. The Core outlines cybersecurity risk-management best practices, organized according to five Functions (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover), along
with increasingly specific and practitioner-oriented Categories, Subcategories,
and Informative References. The “Implementation Tiers” enable organizations to
assess the extent to which they’ve implemented those best practices, and the
“Profiles” enable organizations to establish current and target Profiles and to
track their progress in closing any implementation gaps.
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tices. However, guidance intended for a broad, cross-sector audience
that supports risk-management conversations and advancements
across interdependent sectors and enterprises may compromise relevance with an ever-expanding scope. For example, as draft v1.1 describes, using metrics and measures to understand and convey
meaningful risk information to partners and customers would be valuable, providing a basis for trust both within and between organizations. Yet meaningful ways to demonstrate the effectiveness of
cybersecurity practices and investments are still developing. As this
effort is ongoing, guidance for measuring and demonstrating cybersecurity may more appropriately supplement rather than be integrated into the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, promoting its
continued relevance as a cross-sector baseline.
NIST has released information about its intended next steps, including its intention to release another draft v1.1 and to receive another round of comments from stakeholders.53 In doing so, NIST in
particular recognized the importance of adjusting both the metrics
and measurement and supply-chain risk management sections.
NIST’s continued responsiveness to stakeholders and commitment to
open and iterative engagements is critical to the Framework’s ongoing
use in the ecosystem and its potential to drive advancements in cybersecurity risk management across sectors.
In capturing and promoting baseline best practices in cybersecurity risk management, the Framework has represented an important step forward for U.S. CI protection, and the draft v1.1 update
process demonstrates sustained investment by the U.S. government in
the Framework’s continued relevance and success. The Framework filled a gap by incorporating an array of information-security controls
into the risk-management context. One outcome has been the increasing use of a consistent language, both within and between organizations, which supports continuous improvements in cybersecurity risk
management and supply-chain security.
The Framework’s functioning as a baseline set of best practices has
been critical to this success; however, by definition, implementing a
baseline may not be sufficient to mitigate significantly advanced
threats. Rather than trying to capture every action that a differently
situated CI or U.S. government entity might undertake to reduce or
mitigate advanced, persistent, targeted threats, the Framework has
captured, in a flexible way, a core set of activities and outcomes that
are relevant to mitigate threats that are common across many sectors
and enterprises, including smaller companies integrated into CI sup53. NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK WORKSHOP 2017
SUMMARY (2017), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/07/21/
cybersecurity_framework_workshop_2017_summary_20170721_1.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/KP7X-Q7NC].
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ply chains. Moreover, the Framework has been structured to institutionalize processes of continuous improvement, which may help many
organizations drive more meaningful investments in cybersecurity
risk management. To mitigate the issue of targeted attacks by advanced nation-state threat actors, some organizations need to do more
than just the baseline best practices. They might implement security
in a way that increases the investment required by threat actors to
accomplish nefarious activities, track repeat threat actors to better
understand their techniques and improve targeted mitigations, or
work with others in the ecosystem to track advanced threat-actor
behavior and share effective mitigations. Ultimately, these advanced
actions, undertaken by organizations with a security mission and sufficient resources, compliment the Framework’s approach to establishing processes in support of strategic cybersecurity risk management.
In summary, the widespread adoption of a baseline set of cybersecurity best practices is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
boosting U.S. CI protection across a range of CI providers with different threat profiles. In addition to more advanced defensive measures
responsive to sector- or organization-specific risk scenarios—such as
advanced information sharing and behavioral analytics, pen testing,
red and blue teams, and decoys—other developments or mechanisms
may help to deter or raise the cost of such attacks. The following two
sections turn to two ways that the U.S. and other partner governments might work to do so—namely through international cybersecurity norms and deterrence—including deterrence based on
sharing information publicly about the security benefits of using the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
B. Operationalizing International Cybersecurity Norms on
Critical Infrastructure
In addition to promoting U.S. government and CI adoption of baseline best practices in cybersecurity risk management and sector- or
organization-specific investments in advanced defensive measures,
the U.S. government—in partnership with other governments and private-sector entities—can help to secure CI by advancing cybersecurity
norms intended to limit destructive attacks of the kind discussed in
Part III. Positive progress has been made in 2015–16 in relation to the
distillation and propagation of cybersecurity norms that may be applied to enhancing critical-infrastructure protection. The G2 Cybersecurity Code of Conduct between the U.S. and China, for example,
calls for mutual restraint in economic cyber espionage, particularly
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the theft of trade secrets. It could be expanded to include mutual respect for one another’s critical infrastructure.54
Similarly, the G7 continued its work on cybersecurity in 2016, publishing its view that “no country should conduct or knowingly support
[information and communication technology-enabled] theft of intellectual property” and that all G7 nations should work to “preserve the
global nature of the Internet,” including the free flow of information in
a nod to the notion of cyberspace as a “global networked commons.”55
Such information could explicitly include the protection of data vital to
CI systems. The G20 has taken similar steps to help reinforce a norm
against attacking vulnerable civilian critical infrastructure,56 as has
the U.N. Security Council in 2017.57
The Obama Administration also proposed peacetime norms on CI
protection that were included in the 2015 UN Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) consensus report.58 In particular, the UN GGE agreed
that, during peacetime, “[a] State should not conduct or knowingly
support ICT activity contrary to its obligations under international
law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public.”59 This CI norm could be operationalized to better
define the notion of cybersecurity due diligence,60 but the failure of
the 2017 UN GGE to reach agreement bodes ill for further progress in
the near term.61 On the lead up to this meeting, though, it looked like
54. See Teri Robinson, U.S., China Agree to Cybersecurity Code of Conduct, SC MEDIA
(June 26, 2015), http://www.scmagazine.com/us-china-summit-talks-turn-tocybersecurity/article/423175 [https://perma.unl.edu/4G8B-655M].
55. G7 Leaders Approve Historic Cybersecurity Agreement, BOS. GLOBAL F., http://
bostonglobalforum.org/2016/06/g7-leaders-produce-historic-cybersecurity-agreement [https://perma.unl.edu/FL2Y-QZZR].
56. See Tom Simonite, Do We Need a Digital Geneva Convention?, MIT TECH. REV.
(Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603639/do-we-need-a-digital-geneva-convention [https://perma.unl.edu/K63K-3WK9].
57. UN Security Council Urges Joint Measures to Protect “Critical Infrastructure”
from Terrorist Attacks, UN NEWS CTR. (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID=56163#.WKczuJMrJE4 [https://perma.unl.edu/MT5QJYLR].
58. See U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security, UN General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015).
59. Id. ¶ 13(f).
60. An earlier version of this research appeared as Scott Shackelford, Opinion: How
to Make Democracy Harder to Hack, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 29, 2016),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2016/0729/OpinionHow-to-make-democracy-harder-to-hack [https://perma.unl.edu/8RKH-PUM3];
see also Scott J. Shackelford et al., Making Democracy Harder to Hack, 50 MICH.
J.L. REFORM 629 (2017) (analyzing the applicability of these norms in the context
of election security).
61. See Arun Mohan Sukumar, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed as Well?, LAWFARE (July 4, 2017), https://lawfareblog.com/un-gge-
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a different result was possible. In February 2017, for example, U.S.
State Department Deputy Coordinator for Cyber Issues Michele
Markoff, who attended the 2017 UN GGE meeting on behalf of the
U.S. government, called for the UN GGE to turn its focus to pushing
adoption of norms and confidence-building measures. Addressing an
audience at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Markoff was optimistic about U.S.–Russia cooperation on international
cybersecurity issues, noting that Russia-linked attacks on Ukraine’s
power grid in 2016 did not violate the UN GGE norm because Russia
and Ukraine were in open conflict rather than peacetime. But an open
question remains: given the cyber instability of the recent past, how
can the U.S. deterrence strategy be updated to help safeguard vulnerable U.S. government and CI systems?
C. Deterrence and a Path Forward
As discussed above, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework offers one
approach that companies, individuals, and government agencies
might utilize to improve their cybersecurity practices. Such improvements should help defend against intrusions and other cyber-related
compromises. But can the Framework actually deter such malicious
acts? In this section, we offer one way to link defense with deterrence
and then propose options to strengthen the deterrent value of such
steps.
Simply put, deterrence is about perception. If individual A wants
to prevent individual B from undertaking action X, A has several options. Usually, scholarship considers A’s options in terms of threats: if
A threatens B with unacceptable costs that will result from B undertaking X, then B may think twice and not go forward with X. In that
scenario, A would deter B from taking action X with a credible threat
of cost imposition. The key is that B must perceive that A’s threat is
credible and that the cost A threatens to impose will indeed be costly
and not a mere nuisance. Otherwise, B may not undertake action X for
reasons that have nothing to do with A’s threat to impose cost. For
example, B may simply be unable to underake action X at the present
time, but once he gains the capabilities necessary, he will act. In this
situation, A is not detering B, who still has the will to act. Instead, B
just lacks the means.
Another form of deterrence, also premised on perception, envisions
A deterring B from taking action X not by threatening cost but instead
by denying B’s objectives. B may not think A’s threats are credible or
costly, but if B does not think he will be able to accomplish X because
B perceives A’s defenses to be robust, then B has been deterred. This
failed-international-law-cyberspace-doomed-well
5PGC].

[https://perma.unl.edu/93HY-
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method of deterence, often referred to as “deterrence by denial” is
often seen as a goal of a vulnerable party improving its defenses.
Indeed, a 2015 document by the Obama Administration that outlined a policy of cyber deterrence envisions the Framework as having
just a “deterrence by denial” benefit.62 In that document, they contend
that “[t]he Administration will continue to promote the adoption of the
Framework as a key means of improving U.S. cyber defenses and, by
extension, decreasing adversaries’ perceptions of the benefits to be
gained from engaging in malicious cyber activities against U.S. computers and networks.”63 As the adoption of a set of technical standards
is difficult to politicize, it is possible that the Trump Administration
continues to think of the Framework (or some other related approach)
in similar ways.
The challenge for U.S. policy makers, and for those who adopt the
standards contained within the Framework, is that for the adoption of
those standards to deter an adversary, the adversary has to believe
that the standards, processes, and practices have been implemented
and that the standards, processes, and practices are likely to deny the
adversary from achieving his objectives. Merely adopting the Framework does not deter anyone from doing anything. This is not to say
that the Framework is not worthwhile; it most certainly is, but primarily as a way to improve defenses and increase resiliency. To deter by
denial, the adversary has to believe that Framework adoption makes
it harder to accomplish objectives. Despite the merits of the Framework, it is not clear that, all things being equal, advanced nation-state
threat actors would be deterred from hacking a U.S. utility because
they believed it had adopted the Framework.
It is worth noting that since the adversary’s perception is what is
most key when trying to deter him, making material improvements to
one’s defenses is not necessarily required. If the adversary believes—
rightly or wrongly—that the defenses will deny him his objectives and
if he therefore does not act, then he is deterred. Theoretically, it is
possible to imagine such a scenario: a sophisticated propoganda or
psychological operations campaign might do much to sow doubt in an
adversary’s mind that his attack will be successful, independent of the
true state of his would-be victim’s defenses. While it strains credulity
to imagine A can deter B because B thinks A has adopted the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework when in fact A has not, the broader point is
that B’s perception remains the key variable to determining if deterence is at work.
62. REPORT ON CYBER DETERRENCE POLICY 5 (2015), http://1yxsm73j7aop3quc9y5ifa
w3.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Report-on-Cyber-De
terrence-Policy-Final.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/LMS8-ASWN].
63. Id. at 14.
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In other words, there are options for those wishing to think of the
Framework through the construct of deterrence. Three options are
presented below that can help to influence a would-be attacker’s
perceptions.
1. Publicize Benefits as Applied
To have a chance at deterring a would-be attacker, there needs to
be more of a public effort to explain why the Framework’s standards,
processes, and practices would deny that attacker his objectives. In its
cyber-deterrence policy quoted previously, the Obama Administration
asserted this link, but it did not explain it. If the Trump Administration shares the previous team’s thinking, it could do more to stress
why three or four key principles in the Framework stand to deter an
adversary. One example is the adoption of multifactor authentication.
The task is not to explain the merits of this rather obvious security
measure but to message just how successful it is at blunting an adversarial hacker’s efforts to gain unauthorized access to an account by
harvesting user credentials. Statistics can be gathered and publicized
about how many intrusions in previous years exploited the absence of
a second factor of authentication. Given that adding a second factor of
authentication can be as simple as a mere configuration change, more
can be said about the relative ease and lack of expense to adopt it
versus the additional effort an adversary may need to expend to overcome it and achieve his objectives.
2. Publicize Exercise Results
Those who have adopted, or are adopting, the Framework would be
wise to exercise how a range of cyber attacks by a determined attacker
would fare. While deep technical details need not be publicized, thorough explanations of the scenarios tested, how defenses associated
with the Framework functioned, and how much more damage could
have been wrought without adopting the Framework could be useful
areas about which to message.
3. Publicize Updates
Some of the recommendations contained in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework risk being outdated as attackers evolve their
techniques. It would be wise for NIST to commit to an update cycle
and for those who adopt the Framework to stress their continuing
commitment to put in place recommended updates in a timely manner. And of course, the key is to publicize the commitment and evidence of adhering to it.
To be sure, public messaging about adopting the Framework is unlikely to deter an advanced and determined adversary. But at this
point, the prevailing culture of defending against cyber attacks em-
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phasizes secrecy more than publicity. A less public posture may be
wise for operational security and other practical reasons, but it undermines the opportunity for deterrence by denial. Companies and agencies may, when given the choice, still choose a subtler approach to
public engagement—and that may be the most prudent course of action—but they should be aware that, by doing so, they will have to
look to shape the adversary’s perceptions by other means.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has examined the multifaceted cyber threat to U.S.
government systems and CI by exploring campaigns from Moonlight
Maze to the 2016 DNC hacks that have been linked to Russia, as well
as the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukraine. These incidents
demonstrate a need for strengthening defenses on the part of governmental and critical-infrastructure providers and a credible deterrence
strategy going forward. The Framework, including the most recent
v1.1 update, is a helpful step forward in this regard, especially considering its utility in establishing a common baseline and a common vocabulary based around cybersecurity risk management. However, to
deter advanced threat actors from especially valuable CI targets, use
of the Framework should be considered one step in a multipronged
campaign that includes the further definition and dissemination of international cybersecurity norms to help safeguard critical infrastructure, along with publicizing the benefits of the Framework itself to
help deter foreign adversaries. None of these recommendations are a
magic bullet, of course. But perhaps they do not need to be. After all,
the Australian government, for example, has reportedly been succcessful in preventing eighty-five percent of cyber attacks on its networks through following three common-sense techniques: application
whitelisting (only permitting pre-approved programs to operate on
networks), regularly patching applications and operating systems,
and minimizing “the number of users with administrative privileges”—all baseline best practices promoted through the Framework.64 Though U.S. systems are at a different scale, such efforts help
to highlight the fact that the cyber threat may be complex and sophisticated, but individual attacks are not. As such, by leveraging cybersecurity risk-management best practices, such as those promoted
within the Framework, many attacks can be thwarted. In addition,
deterrence and international norm-building efforts can shift the
calculus of more advanced, state-sponsored cyber attacks in favor of
making them an exception to a relative state of cyber peace.
64. JAMES A. LEWIS, RAISING THE BAR FOR CYBERSECURITY 7–8 (2013), http://csis.org/
files/publication/130212_Lewis_RaisingBarCybersecurity.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/6Z2B-AJBV].

